Monetary effects of inequality: lessons from the euro experiment by A. Filippin & L. Nunziata
Monetary Effects of Inequality:
Lessons from the Euro Experiment
Antonio Filippin∗1 and Luca Nunziata†2
1University of Milan and IZA
2University of Padua and IZA
July 16, 2018
Abstract
We propose a new explanation for the decoupling of official and perceived inflation
based on relative consumption concerns. In presence of high inequality, when the con-
sumers’ reference point of consumption is more distant to reach, a tight budget constraint
is likely to be misperceived as a currency’s loss of purchasing power. Using data from a
set of 15 European countries in the period 1990-2008, we estimate the effect of inequality
on inflation perception. Our research design exploits the exogenous variation in inequality
induced by the reduction in social expenditure that accompanied the implementation of
the convergence criteria set up by the Maastricht treaty, in the years preceding the Euro
changeover. Our results confirm that an increase in inequality significantly affects the
deviation of inflation perceptions from actual inflation.
Keywords: Inflation perception, Inequality, Consumption, Saving, Social Expenditure, Euro
JEL Classification Numbers: E31, E21, E03, D63.
∗Corresponding author; Department of Economics, University of Milan, Via Conservatorio 7, 20122 Milano,
Italy, e-mail: antonio.filippin@unimi.it
†Department of Economics, University of Padua, Via del Santo 33, 35121, Padua, Italy, e-mail:
luca.nunziata@unipd.it.
1
1 Introduction
What drives inflation perceptions? And how can inflation perceptions diverge from actual
inflation dynamics? These are relevant questions for the policy maker. When perceptions di-
verge from actual inflation, they may have real economic effects if for instance they map into
inflation expectations (Fluch and Stix, 2005; Blanchflower and Kelly, 2008). Moreover, a mis-
perception of price dynamics can cause suboptimal consumption decisions and more generally
a misallocation of resources.
One of the most paradigmatic example of how inflation perceptions may deviate from actual
inflation is certainly what observed in Europe in the 2000s. A stunning increase in inflation
perceptions has been observed in the Euro zone, as documented by Figure 1, while official
statistics exclude that an actual increase in prices of that magnitude took place in the same
years (Gaiotti and Lippi, 2004; Adriani et al., 2009; Angelini and Lippi, 2008).1 Many explana-
tions have been provided for why inflation perceptions could have overestimated price variations
around and after the changeover, ranging from price dynamics of frequently purchased items
(Del Giovane and Sabbatini, 2008), to the role played by large price hikes of single items (Mal-
garini, 2009), to fallacies in the recollection of prices in pre-Euro national currencies (Cestari
et al., 2008; Ehrmann, 2006). Although significant, the role played by such factors does not
appear to account for the entire magnitude of the decoupling between measured and perceived
inflation (Marini et al., 2007), leaving room for additional interpretations.
We propose a novel behavioral explanation of why inflation perceptions may systematically
diverge from actual inflation, based on relative consumption concerns and inequality. The rapid
increase in the technological content of consumer goods and the rise in inequality experienced by
most OECD countries in the past decades (Atkinson et al., 2011) have triggered new benchmarks
for consumerism, mainly induced by the increasingly comfortable consumption patterns of
the wealthiest part of the income distribution. This mechanism is based on the diffusion of
positional goods that generate an increasing desire for emulation and consumption of such
goods in the whole income distribution.
Several contributions in the literature investigate the effects on consumption decisions of this
1Similarly, Caporale and Kontonikas (2009) find that steady state inflation does not change after the intro-
duction of the Euro and that in some EMU countries the link between inflation and inflation uncertainty breaks
down before the changeover.
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phenomenon, which is popularly referred to as “keeping up with the Joneses.” We posit that
relative consumption concerns might also have monetary consequences. Consumers may find
themselves increasingly budget-constrained in relation to the larger or more expensive bundle
of goods they may desire to consume, while not being able to do so. They may then attribute
their insufficient purchasing power to price inflation rather than to the relative worsening of
their economic conditions compared to their typically richer reference group. This mechanism
can be driven by an aspiration level of consumption well beyond the optimal consumption
patterns justified by permanent income, and may affect consumers located along the whole
income distribution.
In this paper we provide an empirical investigation of whether this is the case by analyzing
the effect of inequality on inflation perceptions’ dynamics. However, testing the causal effect
of inequality on inflation perception is not an easy task. Both phenomena may be driven
by common third factors and a positive correlation of inflation perception and inequality may
simply reflect the effect of omitted variables. For this reason, we adopt an instrumental variable
research design by exploiting the natural experiment represented by the ratification of the
Maastricht treaty in 1992 and the exogenous change in social expenditure and inequality that
followed in many signatory countries.
Social expenditure cuts have been shown to significantly correlate with an increase in inequality.
For instance, using a panel of 18 industrialised countries, Agnello and Sousa (2013) show
that fiscal consolidation periods, when social expenditure is generally reduced, are generally
associated with an increase in income inequality. Similar evidence is provided by Ball et al.
(2013) and Woo et al. (2013), who also point out that spending cuts have larger distributional
effects than tax-based adjustments. Bertola (2010) suggests that the European Monetary Union
was associated with a small but significant increase in disposable income inequality, accounted
for by cuts in social policies. Concurring evidence is shown by Bouvet (2010), who reports an
increase in within-country inequality (as measured by the Theil index) of about 11% due to
the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact in the period 1997-2003.
Our research design consists in estimating a three equations model, in which inflation percep-
tions are explained by income inequality (plus actual inflation and other controls) on data from
15 western European countries collected from 1990 to 2008. Our instrument for inequality is the
exogenous reduction in per capita government social expenditure imposed by the Maastricht
Treaty on the Euro adopting countries in order to meet the convergence criteria. The signing
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and design of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 can be considered exogenous in the context of our
analysis since the treaty was the result of the political contingencies of the time, in conjunction
with the decades-long process of economic and political integration among European countries.
In addition, the reasons why the non-signing countries decided not to join the Euro area were
mostly related to the traditional opposition of national voters to the idea of a loss of sovereignty
implied by a stricter European integration, rather than to the specific economic circumstances
of the time. The implicit assumption is that the treaty had no direct impact on inequality and
inflation perceptions (after controlling for actual inflation and other macroeconomic controls)
other than through the fiscal consolidation that was at the core of the agreement. Since our
aim is investigating the divergence between perceived and actual inflation, we control for ac-
tual inflation in all our specifications, accounting for all possible monetary factors that may be
relevant to the relationship of interest.2
Our first stage regressions confirm that social expenditure has been negatively affected by the
fiscal consolidation initiated by the single currency process. In addition, the second stage shows
that social expenditure is indeed strongly and negatively correlated with inequality. Finally,
inequality is found to have a significant and positive effect on inflation perceptions and nega-
tive on perceived savings, after controlling for actual savings. Our findings survive a number
of robustness checks, including a different specification where we control for unobservable in-
stitutional country characteristics through country fixed effects.
Our contribution is novel, as it proposes an original behavioral perspective on the monetary
consequences of inequality, something so far neglected in the literature. Moreover, we propose
an innovative quasi-experimental research design to investigate the relationship between in-
equality and inflation perceptions. The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the
theoretical framework underlying the link between inequality and inflation perceptions. Section
3 illustrates our research design and Section 4 presents the data. Our empirical findings are
discussed in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2We therefore indirectly control for all economic and institutional determinants of actual inflation (Bowdler
and Nunziata, 2006, 2007b,a; Andersson et al., 2009).
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2 Relative Consumption and Inflation Perception
Many economists have stressed the importance of relative as opposed to absolute income levels,
i.e. of income comparisons within reference groups, in explaining economic behavior.3 Recent
literature has put emphasis on the negative externalities deriving from social competition based
on positional goods, whose only goal is that of maintaining/improving one’s own status in
the social ranking. This is the so-called “keeping up with the Joneses” hypothesis. Some
empirical analyses (e.g., Ferrer-i Carbonell, 2005) confirmed the importance of relative income
comparisons for life satisfaction.
The “keeping up with the Joneses” phenomenon can be illustrated using the expenditure cas-
cade model (Frank et al., 2014), that introduces a process in which increased expenditure by
some individuals leads others just below them on the income scale to spend more as well.
Such a mechanism captures a concern for relative consumption in the utility function and it is
formalized as:
C∗i = (1− a)kYi + aCi+1, (1)
where C∗i indicates the aspiration level of consumption of the ith consumer and Yi denotes her
permanent income levels, while Ci+1 represents the current consumption level of the individual
whose permanent income ranks just ahead of i ’s own. k is the fraction of permanent income
spent, and a is the parameter weighting the influence of higher income consumers’ spending.
This step by step comparison enables the richest top percentiles in the income distribution to
influence the rest of the consumers by inducing more expensive patterns in desirable consump-
tion. A direct implication is a decrease in savings that might induce dynamic inefficiencies in
terms of a decline in future consumption. Another feature of this model is that the concern for
relative consumption magnifies the economic role played by inequality.4
We believe that “keeping up with the Joneses” triggers monetary consequences, too. The effort
3Veblen (1899) introduced the concept of “conspicuous consumption,” attributing a status-seeking function
to consumption activities. The “relative income hypothesis” was later on formulated by Duesenberry (1949), who
stressed the asymmetric and upward nature of social comparisons, while Hirsch (1976) identified the category
of “positional goods,” i.e. goods from which the individual derives utility in relative terms, in the sense that
their ownership defines the individual position in the social hierarchy.
4Aspiration levels of consumption have also been analyzed under a Prospect Theory framework, in order to
investigate their dynamic effect on economic growth, in relation to inequality (Bogliacino and Ortoleva, 2015;
Genicot and Ray, 2017).
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necessary to match the consumption level of the reference group, or the inability of doing so, can
generate a feeling of financial distress that is likely to be confounded with a loss of purchasing
power, thereby affecting inflation perceptions. Such a mechanism is consistent with a form
of self-serving bias, i.e. the tendency to blame external factors as responsible for negative
outcomes in order to preserve one’s self esteem.5 In case of the monetary effects of “keeping up
with the Joneses,” consumer’s loss of purchasing power in relative terms would be attributed
to a change in prices (external condition), rather than to the deterioration of her/his relative
economic and social status.
A natural objection to this argument regards the reason why agents should misperceive the
change in prices since detailed and objective statistics about inflation are readily available to
the public. What makes possible (and likely) such a misperception is that the variation in the
Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) only accounts for price changes of a given bundle
of goods, and not for a change in the value of such bundle in absolute terms. Consequently, a
consumer who is compensated for the variation in inflation, can maintain a constant standard
of living but cannot sustain an increasing one. 6
In contrast, the concept of an acceptable standard of living in a mature economy is dynamic
in nature and likely to adjust over time according to factors such as technological progress,
social habits and role models. According to hedonic adaptation theory, the higher well-being
linked to increased income wears off with time, because individuals adjust their aspirations
upward proportionally to the increase in income.7 As a result, dynamic aspirations make for an
almost constant level of happiness during the life cycle. This process is often described by the
metaphor of the hedonic treadmill introduced by Brickman and Campbell (1971). Kahneman
et al. (2004) distinguish instead between an hedonic treadmill depending on adaptation, and a
satisfaction treadmill depending on aspiration. If aspirations are shaped by a social comparison,
the metaphor becomes that of a “social treadmill” (Stutzer, 2004; Bruni, 2009). Positional goods
are first consumed by the wealthiest part of the population and then they tend to be consumed
5 This cognitive bias has been studied extensively in social psychology (see Mezulis et al., 2004, and references
therein) and has been detected in various decision frameworks, including consumer choice (Moon, 2003).
6The HICP tracks the price change of a basket of goods the value of which is supposed to be constant in
real terms. When obsolete items are replaced with modern and more valuable counterparts (e.g. the compass
with the GPS locator) the weights of the items in the basket are revised. The revised weights, however, count
only toward the aggregation of future price changes, but not as far as the value of the basket is concerned. In
other words, the mere substitution of the compass with the GPS locator does not alter the level of the index.
7For instance, Di Tella et al. (2010) show that most of the current year’s impact of an increase in income
on happiness is lost over the following four years.
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more and more across the whole income distribution. Not possessing such a good, when its
possession spreads among consumers, generates an increasing feeling of relative deprivation.
Such a mechanism can therefore rationalize why a higher consumption level in absolute terms
may not be perceived as an increasing standard of living, or why a constant consumption level
in presence of higher income inequality may be perceived as a distress.
We present the monetary counterpart of “keeping up with the Joneses” as an overestimation of
inflation whenever real incomes do not increase harmonically with desired consumption patterns.
Such a mechanism is captured by an inflation perception equation that includes an aspiration
level of consumption C∗i derived in a similar manner as in Equation (1), which internalizes
relative consumption concerns:
p˜ii = pi + αf(C
∗
i − CYi ). (2)
Defining p˜ii the individual perception of the actual inflation pi, the difference between perceived
and measured inflation is supposed to be affected by the gap between the aspiration level
of consumption and the optimal consumption level CYi generated by any level of permanent
income Y in absence of any social comparison.
When the the aspiration level C∗i increases, agent i is induced to change her/his consumption
patterns through an increase in consumption expenditure over the optimal level. Alternatively,
in presence of budget or liquidity constraints the agent perceives a relative deprivation effect
since the aspiration level of consumption is not met. For example, if my neighbour buys a brand
new car, I am induced to do the same, and in order to do so I may cut savings. As a result, I
may perceive that the costs of living have increased and I may wrongly attribute that to the
loss of purchasing power due to inflation. Alternatively, in presence of liquidity constraints or
other reasons that prevent me from buying the new car, I will suffer a disutility due to the
increased distance between my actual consumption pattern and that of my neighbour. In this
case the consumption gap would be perceived as a constraint in my spending capacity that
I may wrongly attribute to rising inflation. In both cases (decrease of savings and foregone
consumption) what matters is that the gap between my aspiration consumption level and the
optimal consumption pattern given my permanent income widens.
This mechanism relies on two implicit assumptions. First, each household’s actual consumption
is affected by the consumption pattern of its reference group. Second, the insufficient purchasing
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power is wrongly attributed to higher prices rather than to a lower relative income.
As regards the first point, micro data evidence provided by the European Social Survey (see
Table A.1 in the Appendix) shows how the importance of being rich, have money and expensive
things, i.e. to follow the consumption patterns of richer consumers, is evenly distributed among
European residents across the whole income distribution, with only a significant difference for
the 5th and top decile when compared to the first. This means that the desire to acquire expen-
sive things is pretty homogeneous across income deciles, irrespectively of the actual consumers’
purchasing power. If such desire is not matched by the ability to afford a sufficiently affluent
consumption pattern, consumers might feel frustrated. Such frustration is likely to increase in
presence of growing inequality due to the consequent shift in consumers’ reference point.
A testable implication of the second point is that economic distress should exacerbate inflation
misperceptions. Del Giovane et al. (2008) document that the divergence between perceived and
actual inflation is indeed stronger for individuals characterized by a relatively worse financial
situation, even after controlling for literacy and educational levels.8 Different inflation per-
ceptions across the income distribution are not driven by exposure to different levels of actual
inflation, that has been shown to be pretty homogeneous across income deciles. For example,
Del Giovane and Sabbatini (2008) estimate the inflation rate by class of expenditure in 2002
and 2003. Considering the distribution by consumption pattern for each segment of population,
the reported differences in actual inflation across income deciles are indeed negligible. Eurostat
data show that inflation perceptions tend to overestimate measured inflation across the whole
income distribution, although being exacerbated by economic distress. This evidence supports
the idea that the mismatch between desired and actual consumption is present also among high
income quantiles.
3 Research Design
An ideal empirical test of Equation (2) would require to check how individual inflation per-
ceptions react to individual actual and foregone consumption patterns. However, it is hard to
identify a reference group that could simulate the unobservable aspiration level of consumption
8Linde´n (2005) shows that the gap between measured and perceived inflation tends to be smaller for indi-
viduals with higher education.
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at the individual level. We therefore choose to conduct an empirical investigation of the effect of
interest through a different strategy, by concentrating on the actual driver of social comparison
at the aggregate level, i.e. inequality.
By definition, an increase in inequality signals a disharmonic change in income levels, that is
accompanied by an increased gap between the consumption patterns of economic agents and
their reference group. The mechanism above is absent, by construction, in hypothetical societies
where there is no inequality. On the contrary, when incomes grow at a much slower pace than
what needed to fulfil the aspirations driven by social comparison, individuals may feel budget
constrained and perceive a loss of purchasing power even though they are not impoverished in
absolute terms. As a result, an increase in inequality may contribute to a misperception of the
true inflation level.
Our analysis will therefore focus on the link between inequality and inflation perceptions at the
aggregate level. Our baseline estimated model will be:
p˜iit = β0 + β1Iit + β2piit + β3Xit + λt + , (3)
where p˜i, I and pi are, respectively, aggregate measures of inflation perceptions, inequality and
actual inflation at the country (i) and year (t) level, X represents a vector of controls, including
a dummy for the actual introduction of the Euro currency, λt a set of year fixed effects and 
is a stochastic term.
In the last decades a widespread increase in economic inequality has been observed in advanced
economies (Piketty and Saez, 2003; Atkinson et al., 2011; Bogliacino and Maestri, 2014; To´th,
2014). If our conjecture is correct, the higher inequality, the stronger the relative deprivation felt
by consumers along the whole income distribution. The increase in relative deprivation should
have deteriorated their perceived purchasing power, which may then wrongly be attributed to
increasing prices, thus increasing their inflation perceptions.
European data are particularly suited for our analysis since it has been shown that inequality
has a higher impact on individual happiness in Europe than in the US (Alesina et al., 2004).
Figure 2, drawn for the major 15 European countries in the period 1990-2008, shows how
inequality, measured by a Gini index, is positively correlated with inflation misperceptions, i.e.
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with the residuals of a regression of inflation perception on actual inflation and time dummies.9
In the figure we notice two clusters of countries, characterized by different levels of inequality
with Mediterranean countries and the UK typically associated with higher levels of inequality
than the rest of Europe. The misperception of inflation is systematically higher when inequality
is higher, and viceversa. The positive association is confirmed by OLS estimates of the same
model (not reported).
Such association may however be confounded by unobservable factors affecting both inequality
and inflation perceptions. For example, in a scenario characterized by rising inequality and
expectations of strong future GDP growth, inflation perceptions may anticipate actual changes
in inflation growth, therefore generating a spurious correlation between inequality and per-
ceptions. Ideally, we would need an exogenous shift in a suitable instrument that would, in
turn, trigger a change in inequality in an experimental fashion, in order to check its causal
implications in terms of inflation perceptions.
One candidate instrument is an exogenous shift in social expenditure, a variable which is
typically associated with lower inequality, as shown for instance by Bertola (2010) and Niehues
(2010). This correlation is confirmed by our data on EU-15 countries as we can see from
Figure 3. However, social expenditure is not necessarily exogenous in a model of inflation
perception. We need therefore to identify a change in policies that is not directly correlated
to the factors behind inflation perception and that may generate such an exogenous change in
social expenditure. To this aim, we exploit the natural experiment of history constituted by
the process of implementation of the Euro currency, and in particular the different treatment
status between Euro-adopting and non-adopting countries. The idea is that the fiscal tightening
that accompanied the Maastricht treaty was larger in the first group of countries in the years
preceding the Euro changeover, thereby inducing an exogenous change in social expenditure,
with a resulting increase in inequality.10
Figure 4 plots the difference between the per capita social expenditure in each country subject
to the Maastricht Treaty budget constraints, and the average of those that did not signed
the treaty. Our treatment group of Euro-adopting countries that were affected by exogenous
social expenditure cuts compared to non adopting countries include Austria, Belgium, Finland,
9For details on data construction, see Section 4 below.
10Following Heckman (2000), our approach is in the tradition of using natural social experiments to identify
the causal effect of interest.
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France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Spain, Netherlands and Portugal. The effect of the
tightening in per capita social expenditure is clearly visible and it appears to persist until 2008,
although the largest reduction took place in the years preceding the changeover. The only Euro
adopting country that does not show any appreciable reduction in social expenditure compared
to the non-adopting countries is Luxembourg, where we observe an increase from 1990 to 2008.
An implication of the constraint on public finances, and on social expenditure in particular,
was an increase in inequality that was not limited to those countries that were hit by the major
adjustments (Bertola, 2010). We can therefore exploit the change in inequality triggered by
an exogenous reduction in per-capita social expenditure to estimate the effect of inequality on
inflation perceptions.11
Our baseline model will therefore consist in estimating equation (3) through a 3SLS procedure
where the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 induces a quasi-experimental manipulation
in social expenditure in the signing countries due to the convergence criteria compared to the
non signing countries (first stage). Such change may exogenously affect inequality (second
stage) that in turns may shape inflation perceptions (third stage). We then perform a series
of robustness checks on our baseline model, including testing whether our findings survive
after we include a series of additional controls, when we use alternative measures of social
expenditure, and whether our findings depend on the inclusion of specific countries (adopting
and non-adopting) in the sample. We also check whether our findings are robust to a change
in specification where we estimate equation (3) including country fixed effects though a 2SLS
procedure.
Our identification strategy relies on the assumption that the implementation of the Maastricht
Treaty had no direct impact on inequality and inflation perceptions (after controlling for actual
inflation) other than through the fiscal consolidation that was at the core of the agreement. This
assumption would be invalid if countries decided to adopt the single currency on the basis of
inflation perception or inequality concerns. However, the signing and design of the Maastricht
Treaty in 1992 was largely the result of the political contingencies of the time in conjunction with
the post-World War II historical process of economic and political integration among European
countries. The control group of non-adopting countries that were not subject to such restrictions
on fiscal policies include Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom. These countries decided
11This approach is similar to the strategy adopted by Becker and Woessmann (2009) in estimating the effect
of Protestantism on literacy and economic performance in 19th century Prussia.
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not to join the Euro area for political motives that are likely to be exogenous in our model. At
the time, a large fraction of UK voters was traditionally eurosceptic and considered the single
currency a dangerous step toward a tighter political integration in Europe and a consequent loss
of sovereignty that they firmly rejected.12 Similar concerns were voiced in Denmark and Sweden.
Denmark negotiated the possibility to stay out of the common currency under the Maastricht
Treaty through the exceptions included in the Edinburgh Agreement signed in December 1992,
whereas Sweden decided not to comply with the treaty convergence criteria that included as a
precondition the adoption of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism. A referendum on the
introduction of the Euro was defeated in both countries, in 2000 and 2003 respectively.
Furthermore, the characteristics of both adopting and non adopting countries vary considerably
in terms of average pre-treaty inequality and social expenditure. If we look at the data on social
expenditure in the early 1990s, i.e. before the Maastricht Treaty’s effects on adopting countries
became visible, we do not see any peculiar pattern of non adopting countries when compared
to non adopting countries.13 Similarly, inequality tend to be low in Denmark and Sweden,
but also in Belgium, Finland, and the Netherlands. This is further indication that the choice
of staying in or out of the single currency was not related to social expenditure or inequality
patterns.
Our sample years, comprised between 1990 and 2008, are a suitable period to analyze the effects
of the Euro experiment on inequality and in turn on inflation perceptions. Indeed, the fiscal
tightening started after the Maastricht treaty was signed in 1992 and reached its peak at around
2000 just before the currency changeover.14 We prefer to exclude the years following 2008 to
eliminate the global financial crisis’ confounding effect. Nevertheless our findings are robust to
the inclusion of those years, given that all our specifications control for year fixed effects.
12This attitude was confirmed more than two decades later by the “Brexit” referendum results in June 2016.
13The picture on per-capita social expenditure levels in adopting and non adopting countries was mixed, as in
the rest of our sample years. The two countries characterized by the highest level of per-capita social expenditure
were Denmark and Luxembourg. Sweden was in line with the Northern European adopting countries, while the
UK displayed a very low level of social expenditure, comparable to the adopting mediterranean countries.
14The Council’s assessment (98/317/CE) on the fulfilment of the convergence criteria was based on the
figures of the fiscal year 1997. It is worth noting that the Maastricht criteria have to be fulfilled on a permanent
basis, and therefore the fiscal tightening could not be easily reversed afterwards.
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4 The Data
Our analysis is based on data collected for the group of EU-15 countries. Our dataset includes
the countries that introduced the Euro coins and bills in 2002 (Austria, Belgium, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain),
as well as those countries that did not adopt the single currency (Denmark, Sweden and the
UK). The data cover the period 1990-2008 from different data sources. In what follows we
describe all the variables used in our estimates. Summary statistics are provided in Table 1.
TABLE 1 AROUND HERE
The data on Inflation perceptions are derived from representative surveys at the national level,
collected monthly by national institutes of the EU Member States on behalf of the European
Commission (DG ECFIN) as part of the Joint EU Harmonised Programme of Business and
Consumer Surveys (EC, 2014). More than 20,000 subjects every month answer to the question
“How do you think that consumer prices have developed over the last 12 months?” by choosing
among different categories:
1. risen a lot;
2. risen moderately;
3. risen slightly;
4. stayed about the same;
5. fallen.
As commonly done in the literature (Ehrmann, 2006; Biau et al., 2010), our proxy for inflation
perceptions is an aggregate measure of consumers’ opinions derived as the difference in the
weighted frequency f() of answers falling in different categories according to the formula:
Infl.Perc = f(1) +
1
2
f(2)− 1
2
f(4)− f(5).
As shown by Biau et al. (2010), this variable is highly correlated with the inflation perception
measure published by the ECB from 2003 only, i.e. not covering our period of interest. Our
perceived inflation measure varies between a minimum of -58.4 and a maximum of 77.7.
Actual inflation is calculated using the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) inflation
rate, year over year, released monthly by Eurostat.
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Our measure of inequality is the Gini index computed on disposable incomes as provided by
the Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID) (Solt, 2009). The Gini index is
calculated yearly and varies between 21.6 and 36.9 in our sample with some variability both
within and between countries. One of the advantages of the SWIID data, is that it provides the
possibility to perform additional estimations using multiply imputed data methods, in order
to take into account the uncertainty associated with the construction of the inequality data by
country.
Social expenditure is measured by social protection benefits per capita at constant 2000 prices
(source: Eurostat). We consider expenditure for sickness and disability, old age and survivors,
housing and social exclusion, unemployment and families and children as well as excluding social
expenditure for unemployment in some regressions. Original data are provided on a yearly basis.
Taking logs, our measure varies between 7.6 and 9.7 in our sample. For a robustness check we
also consider social expenditure expressed as a share of GDP.
We also provide additional analysis of the effect of inequality on perceived savings. The afore-
mentioned Joint EU Harmonised Programme of Business and Consumer Surveys also asks
subjects “Which of these statements best describes the current financial situation of your house-
hold?”. Aggregate self-reported ability to save is derived as the difference in the cumulative
frequency of those who answer “we are saving a lot,” or “we are saving a little” minus those
who answered “we are having to draw on our savings,” or “we are running into debt.” Note
that this variable does not capture actual savings but a perceived measure of savings that may
reflect a comparison between actual and desired level of consumption.
Our specifications include a set of macroeconomic controls. The actual net household saving rate
is provided by the OECD System of National Accounts and it is defined as “the subtraction
of household consumption expenditure from household disposable income, plus the change
in net equity of households in pension funds”. It is measured as percentage of household
disposable income. Unemployment and real GDP growth are also provided by the OECD.
Other controls include house price inflation, from the OECD, and an indicator of the country’s
general participation in tertiary education, measured as the number of students enrolled in
tertiary education in a given academic year per 100,000 inhabitants, from the Barro and Lee
(2010) dataset. In order to control for trade specialization patterns that may be affected by the
tighter economic integration induced by the Maastricht Treaty, we use a measure of fixed capital
formation as a share of GDP from Eurostat, and a Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (Herfindahl,
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1950; Hirschman, 1964) from the World Integrated Trade Solution dataset, assembled by the
World Bank in collaboration with United Nations Statistical Division and the World Trade
Organization.
5 Empirical Findings
5.1 3SLS Estimates
Table 2 presents our baseline Three Stages Least Squares (3SLS) estimations that display the
effect of the Maastricht Treaty on per capita social expenditure, the implications of expenditure
cuts on income inequality and the effect of inequality on inflation perception. All models
are estimated using a Limited Information Maximum Likelihood (LIML) estimator that is
characterized by good small sample properties even if instruments are weak. All models control
for the actual introduction of the Euro coins and bills in January 2002. This is an important
test for our analysis, since Figure 1 shows that the decoupling between actual and perceived
inflation in the Euro area increase dramatically after 2002, and this may confound our estimates
since year fixed effects are not enough to account for it. We therefore include a dummy variable
equal to 1 starting from 2002 in the adopting countries, that may account for the effect of
consumers’ confusion or approximation about the conversion rates between pre-Euro national
currencies and the single currency.15
We first present our preferred baseline specification, in columns (1)-(3), where we control for
actual inflation, unemployment, and GDP growth, time dummies and a Euro introduction
dummy equal to 1 for all adopting countries after 2002, i.e. excluding any potentially endoge-
nous variable from the specification. Each column in the table represents one of the estimated
equations.
We see in column (1) that the effect of the Maastricht Treaty, i.e. a dummy equal to 1 for
the signing countries from 1992 onward, was a significant reduction in social expenditure. Such
exogenous reduction in social spending that took place in the fiscal consolidation phase following
the signing of the treaty correlates with an increase in inequality (column 2), and the latter is
15Consumers were directly exposed to the conversion rates only a few months before the actual introduction
of the Euro in 2002, with the introduction of double prices (in local currency and in Euro).
15
found to induce an increase in inflation perception (column 3).
The second model, presented in columns (4)-(6), includes an additional macroeconomic control,
i.e. the actual household saving rate, that is not available for some country/year cells. Our
sample is therefore sensibly reduced to 206 observations, but our results are unchanged and the
point estimate of the effect of interest is actually even larger.
All systems of equations in the table show that an exogenous shift in inequality positively affects
inflation perceptions, with the point estimates indicating that a unitary increase in the Gini
index being associated with an increase in the inflation perception index comprised between 2.2
and 2.5. This corresponds to an increase in inflation perceptions between 9.2 and 10.5 for an
increase in inequality equal to a standard deviation in the sample. In comparison, the actual
introduction of the Euro currency in 2002 is associated with an increase in inflation perception
comprised between 38 and 45, i.e. still large even after accounting for the effect of inequality.
This means that the actual introduction of the single currency in the adopting countries did
constitute a dramatic shock on perceptions and that the dynamics in inflation perceptions are
more complex than what the simple plot in Figure 1 may suggest, since the role of inequality
remained hidden by the large and significant impact of the changeover. The F-statistics exclude
the presence of weak instruments in all our regressions.
TABLE 2 AROUND HERE
In Table 3 we provide a set of robustness checks. For convenience, in this table we only present
our third stage and the F-statistics of weak instruments for the first and second stage. One
possible concern for our identification is that social expenditure may affect inflation perception
through the stability of consumption patterns, irrespectively of inequality. For instance, even
those individuals who do not directly benefit from social expenditure might choose a higher
consumption level because they know that they would somehow be protected by the social safety
net in case of a negative shock. By doing so, social expenditure may help reducing the gap with
their consumption aspiration level, thereby reducing their inflation perceptions. We therefore
estimate our model using a measure of social expenditure that excludes unemployment benefits,
i.e. the most important income support measure for households hit by negative labour market
shocks. In addition, unemployment benefits are a social expenditure component that usually
responds to the business cycle and therefore may introduce some endogeneity in our measure.
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Although in our regressions social expenditure is instrumented and we do control for the cycle
through year fixed effects, we re-estimate our model excluding unemployment benefits. Column
(1) presents the resulting effect of inequality on inflation perception. The point estimate of the
effect of interest is equal to 2.2 and still statistically significant. The F-statistics show that we
can safely exclude the hypothesis that our instruments are weak.
In column (2) we include a measure of fixed capital formation, expressed as a share of GDP, to
control for different degrees of capital intensity across countries and account for the potential
heterogeneous effects of trade and specialization patterns induced by the promotion of further
economic integration after the treaty’s signature. Our effect of interest is robust to the inclusion
of this control. Our findings are also robust when we include an Hirschman-Herfindahl Index
that measures market concentration and specialization (Herfindahl, 1950; Hirschman, 1964), as
displayed in column (3).16
In column (4) we control for education as a proxy for financial literacy, since it is possible that
the mismatch between actual and perceived inflation may be mediated by the agents’ ability to
process the available economic information on the topic, as suggested by Linde´n (2005). Our
effect of interest is still significant and an increase in education is associated with a smaller
mismatch between actual and perceived inflation, as expected.
In column (5) we control for housing price inflation. Indeed, our sample years were characterized
by fast increases in housing prices in many countries due to the relative low cost of borrowing.
Such dynamics typically increase the rental income earned by housing investors relative to
other individuals, with a consequent increase in income inequality. In addition, higher housing
prices may also lead to perceptions of higher inflation accompanied by greater misperceptions
given that existing home prices are not included in the HICP. It follows that, in countries with
higher inequality, inflation perceptions may deviate more from actual inflation simply because
of higher housing prices. However, when we control for housing price our estimates are still
statistically significant, and the point estimate of the effect of interest is actually larger at 3.6,
possibly due to our reduced sample size, given the unavailability of house price inflation for
Austria, Greece and Portugal. The coefficient of house price inflation is positively associated
with inflation perception, as expected.
16When included, fixed capital formation is negatively correlated with inequality in the second stage, contrary
to the prediction of the Stolper Samuelson theorem (Stolper and Samuelson, 1941), according to which income
inequality should rise in countries that specialize in capital-intensive production.
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TABLE 3 AROUND HERE
Finally, we estimate a model in column (6) where we control for all these additional variables
together. Since each control contains some missing observations, our sample gets sensibly
reduced. Nevertheless, our estimates are still statistically significant. The null hypothesis of
weak instruments is rejected for each model in the table.17
5.2 Robustness Checks
This section performs a number of robustness analyses. First, we used two alternative methods,
detailed in the Appendix, for correcting for the noise in the SWIID inequality data introduced
by the multiple-imputation procedure used to resolve the trade-off between comparability across
countries and coverage of country/years cells. We never find any appreciable difference in our
estimates when we use any of these corrections.
In addition, we used p90/10 data on disposable income, that however are severely incomplete.
We replicated our analysis using imputation techniques for the missing values, finding that our
results are indeed robust.
As a further robustness control, we estimate our baseline model using an alternative measure
of social expenditure, expressed as share of GDP rather than per capita. This is not an ideal
measure of social expenditure for two reasons. First, it is more prone to business cycle’s
volatility, something that may trigger changes in this explanatory variable that are unrelated
to the shock induced by the Maastricht Treaty. Second, the perceived loss of purchasing power
should be affected by the level of social expenditure. For our baseline model we therefore
prefer a measure accounting for the average amount of social expenditure available for each
national resident. Nevertheless, social expenditure as share of GDP allows us to partial out
systematic differences across countries in the generosity of their welfare state, thereby limiting
the pre-treaty heterogeneity in social expenditure in our sample. Therefore estimating the
model including such variable may shed some light on whether such heterogeneity matters.
Table 4 replicates the specifications presented in Table 2 with no appreciable difference in our
findings.
17These findings are also used for an additional test of omitted variables bias based on the methodology
proposed by Oster (2016). The estimated effect of inequality on inflation perception is remarkably stable to
this check.
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TABLE 4 AROUND HERE
As a further step, we estimate the effect of inequality on perceived savings, a variable that
in presence of relative consumption concerns should be similarly affected by inequality when
subjects struggle to reach their aspiration level of consumption. As shown in Table 5, our
estimates confirm this hypothesis. An increase in inequality is found to reduce perceived savings,
with a point estimate varying between -8.8 and -6.9 when controlling for the actual household
saving rate. Once we control for the actual aggregate saving rate, the estimated effect is likely
to be generated by the feeling of financial distress driven by foregone consumption and it is
consistent with our inflation perception estimates.
TABLE 5 AROUND HERE
We also check how our inflation perception estimates are sensitive to country exclusion, to test
whether our results are driven by the presence of any specific country in the sample. This is
also an indirect check of whether each country’s peculiar reasons for signing the Maastricht
Treaty matter for our identification. We estimate our preferred specification, i.e. the one of
columns (4)-(6) in Table 2, dropping one country at a time from the sample. We drop both
adopting and not adopting countries from our sample (see Table A.2 in the Appendix), finding
that our estimates are remarkably stable and do not depend from the inclusion of any specific
country. The estimated coefficients of inequality range between 1.5 and 3.2. Similar findings
are obtained after controlling for additional macroeconomic variables or house price inflation.
As a further check, we estimate our preferred specification excluding all countries belonging to
the high-inequality cluster in Figure 2, i.e. the southern European countries and the UK. As a
result, the sample drops to 160 observations, but the effect of inequality on perceptions is still
positive and significant.
Finally, we include country fixed effects. Our design exploits the shift in social expenditure
that occurred in adopting countries after 1992. Our estimates therefore are the product of the
cross-sectional variability in the data generated by the country assignment to the treatment
(Euro), as well as by the time series change in social expenditure that occurred after the treaty.
One limitation of our approach is that we do not control for time-invariant country specific
unobservable factors through country fixed effects. One possible answer to this limitation, is
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re-writing the model as a 2SLS specification, i.e. substituting the first-stage Maastricht Treaty
assignment dummy with a set of country dummies in a model where we instrument inequality
with social expenditure in the first stage. This specification relies only upon the effect of
a within country change in social expenditure on inequality, controlling for country-specific
observable and unobservable characteristics. Such a specification responds to possible concerns
related to the exclusion restrictions attached to our treatment variable, i.e. the signing of the
Maastricht Treaty.
TABLE 6 AROUND HERE
Our 2SLS estimates are presented in Table 6, where we summarize the replication of the spec-
ifications presented in Tables 2 and 3. The effect of inequality on inflation perceptions is still
highly significant, and the point estimates are even larger, varying between 5.5 and 13.6. The
effect of the actual changeover in 2002 is smaller than what found in previous models, the
coefficient being lower than 30 and not significant when we include all controls. The sign of
the effect of the remaining controls is as expected, with a larger and significant coefficient for
house price inflation equal to 1.5.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we suggest that inflation perceptions may be affected by inequality via relative
consumption concerns in the attempt to imitate the role models represented by richer agents.
In a scenario of growing inequality, the consumption patterns of each agent’s reference point be-
comes more and more difficult to imitate by relatively less affluent consumers. This mechanism
may take place through an increased demand of positional goods that affects the aspiration
level of consumption along the whole income distribution. As a result of this “trickle-down be-
haviorism”, in the definition by Stiglitz (2011), consumers who cannot match their aspiration
level of consumption may experience a sense of frustration and financial distress that can be
confounded with a loss of the currency’s purchasing power, i.e. with higher inflation percep-
tions. This phenomenon is not confined to the less wealthy and increasingly budget-constrained
portion of the income distribution, but it affects higher income percentiles as well, as agents
are still subject to the influence of social comparison with a richer reference group.
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We provide a first attempt to investigate the relationship between inequality and inflation per-
ception by exploiting the quasi-experimental change in social expenditure that was triggered
by the adoption of the Maastricht treaty in 1992. We find that the reduction in social expendi-
ture induces an increase in income inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient of disposable
income. By instrumenting inequality with an exogenous variation in per-capita social expendi-
ture, we find that an increase in inequality causes a substantial increase in perceived inflation,
after controlling for actual inflation and a number of observable and unobservable factors. In
addition, inequality has a significant negative effect on perceived savings, as expected in pres-
ence of such behavioral pattern.
This mechanism based on relative consumption considerations may contribute to explain the
stunning difference between actual and perceived inflation in European countries in the 2000s,
although we do find that the actual changeover represented a further large shock on inflation
perceptions. Official statistics have often been accused of misreporting inflation figures after
the introduction of the Euro in 2002, because at odds with the European citizens’ common
perception that inflation grew much more than what reported. Our empirical evidence suggest
that part of the decoupling may be explained by the monetary effect attached to “keeping up
with the Joneses” in a period of rapidly growing inequality as before and around the currency
changeover.
Our analysis provides important implications for policy making. By showing that concerns for
relative consumption may have monetary consequences, our results indicates that the policy
maker should take into account consumers’ behavior along this perspective in order to correctly
anticipate the effects of policy interventions. In particular, monetary policy may have different
effects depending on the level of inequality, and any policy having an impact on inequality may
be accompanied by unintended monetary consequences.
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Figure 1: Measured and Perceived Inflation in the Euro Area
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Figure 2: Inequality and Inflation Mispercentions in Euro-15 Countries (1990-2008)
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Figure 3: Inequality and Per Capita Social Expenditure in EU-15 Countries (1990-2008)
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Figure 4: Per Capita Social Expenditure in Euro Countries After Maastricht Treaty
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Table 1: Summary statistics, by country
Country Infl.Perc Actual Infl. Saving Perc. Inequality Social Exp.
Austria 13.24 1.73 44.92 27.19 9155.31
(33.85) (0.72) (13.63) (0.77) (484.26)
Belgium 39.12 2.04 31.75 25.55 7921.12
(17.48) (0.92) (37.57) (1.54) (868.34)
Denmark -21.29 2.01 66.84 23.21 11531.86
(16.79) (0.68) (6.93) (1.32) (1264.71)
Finland -12.67 1.69 10.00 24.68 8117.98
(19.62) (1.01) (13.84) (1.55) (682.02)
France 20.28 1.74 37.61 28.23 8331.38
(26.41) (0.69) (15.06) (0.45) (907.95)
Germany 33.77 1.57 45.27 27.44 8397.05
(17.91) (0.62) (6.44) (0.74) (449.95)
Greece 50.32 3.25 -52.43 33.10 4139.55
(25.33) (0.57) (10.24) (0.87) (651.07)
Ireland 30.95 3.03 23.58 32.04 5335.34
(16.22) (1.14) (13.23) (1.43) (1767.69)
Italy 37.20 2.31 48.14 33.05 6584.77
(16.53) (0.48) (9.26) (1.24) (656.57)
Luxembourg 42.96 2.99 57.19 27.35 15477.10
(8.20) (0.69) (5.54) (0.12) (954.92)
Netherlands 27.69 2.26 61.55 25.55 8700.13
(18.92) (1.07) (3.84) (1.25) (854.19)
Portugal 40.83 2.72 -39.55 34.69 3104.73
(12.31) (0.71) (13.41) (2.11) (685.74)
Spain 34.15 2.94 17.70 33.05 4294.96
(18.05) (0.70) (33.92) (1.69) (490.15)
Sweden -22.78 1.65 8.47 23.47 10250.83
(11.55) (0.80) (8.72) (1.35) (774.34)
United Kingdom 12.06 1.73 14.19 34.09 7603.58
(15.75) (0.73) (12.85) (0.32) (1715.54)
Total 21.32 2.21 26.30 29.01 7618.87
(28.79) (0.95) (35.63) (4.21) (2832.98)
All reported figures are sample averages and standard deviations (in brackets) calculated over the period
1990-2008.
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Table 3: LIML 3SLS Regressions: Perceived Inflation, Robustness
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Infl.Perc. Infl.Perc. Infl.Perc. Infl.Perc. Infl.Perc. Infl.Perc.
Inequality 2.198*** 1.895*** 1.848*** 2.359*** 3.587*** 2.004***
(0.347) (0.300) (0.315) (0.327) (0.477) (0.321)
Actual Inflation 5.826*** 10.210*** 7.941*** 6.205*** 4.813*** 9.399***
(1.146) (1.565) (0.993) (1.182) (1.504) (1.381)
Euro Introduction 45.282*** 44.047*** 44.071*** 41.652*** 45.762*** 33.724***
(2.730) (2.696) (3.046) (3.122) (3.635) (3.268)
Fixed Capital, % GDP -0.379 1.486***
(0.365) (0.522)
HH Index 6.892 28.001
(44.538) (67.005)
Education -0.005*** -0.018***
(0.002) (0.002)
House Price Infl. 0.620** 0.033
(0.282) (0.249)
Observations 246 211 223 226 196 147
R-squared 0.690 0.743 0.748 0.717 0.639 0.851
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Macro Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
UB in Social Exp. NO YES YES YES YES YES
F Weak Instr. 1st st. 43.44 36.41 41.59 44.10 28.17 29.39
F Weak Instr. 2nd st. 145.8 244.6 151.0 242.4 145.1 399.4
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
3SLS estimations of the effect of inequality on inflation perceptions in EU-15 countries from 1990 to 2008. The de-
pendent variable is the inflation perception index (varying between a minimum of -58.4 and a maximum of 77.7 in
the sample). Inequality is measured by a Gini index varying between 21.6 and 36.9. Per capita social expenditure in
logs varies between 7.6 and 9.7. Controls are actual inflation, unemployment rate, real GDP growth and year fixed
effects. The excluded instrument for inequality is social expenditure. The excluded instrument for social expendi-
ture is a dummy for the signature of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. The Euro introduction dummy is equal to 1 for
all adopting countries after 2002.
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Table 5: LIML 3SLS Regressions: Perceived Savings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Social Exp. Inequality Infl.Perc. Social Exp. Inequality Infl.Perc.
Inequality -8.835*** -6.877***
(0.872) (0.686)
Social Expenditure -5.297** -5.776***
(2.254) (1.714)
Maastricht Treaty -0.300*** -0.455***
(0.047) (0.061)
Actual Inflation 3.229 8.990***
(2.390) (2.682)
Euro Introduction 1.294 -10.511
(10.394) (10.510)
Observations 246 246 246 206 206 206
R-squared 0.365 0.527 0.546 0.574 0.174
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Macro Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
UB in Social Exp. YES YES YES YES YES YES
Household Savings NO NO NO YES YES YES
F Stat Weak Instr. 39.93 181.5 56.27 338.4
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
3SLS estimations of the effect of inequality on perceived savings in EU-15 countries from 1990 to 2008. The de-
pendent variable is the perceived savings index (varying between a minimum of -67.3 and a maximum of 78.4 in
the sample). Inequality is measured by a Gini index varying between 21.6 and 36.9. Per capita social expenditure
in logs varies between 7.6 and 9.7. Controls are actual inflation, unemployment rate, real GDP growth and year
fixed effects. The excluded instrument for inequality is social expenditure. The excluded instrument for social
expenditure is a dummy for the signature of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992.
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Table 6: LIML 2SLS Regressions: Perceived Inflation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Infl.Perc. Infl.Perc. Infl.Perc. Infl.Perc. Infl.Perc.
Inequality 6.898** 9.302*** 5.544*** 13.658*** 11.992***
(2.774) (2.774) (1.832) (3.652) (2.105)
Actual Inflation 7.599*** 8.953*** 7.089*** 8.323*** 10.134***
(1.292) (1.278) (1.153) (1.347) (1.035)
Household Savings -0.669 -0.847
(0.591) (0.535)
Euro Introduction 25.737*** 28.370*** 23.416*** 22.874*** 4.547
(3.686) (3.906) (4.045) (5.377) (6.036)
Education -0.009** -0.036***
(0.004) (0.006)
House Price Infl. 1.470*** 0.924***
(0.438) (0.267)
Observations 246 206 226 196 154
R-squared 0.831 0.807 0.861 0.714 0.889
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES
Macro Controls YES YES YES YES YES
UB in Social Exp. YES YES YES YES YES
First Stage Coeff -3.002 -4.083 -4.620 -3.289 -4.425
First Stage SE 0.824 0.950 0.832 0.958 0.826
F Stat Weak Instr. 13.26 18.46 30.86 11.79 28.73
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
2SLS estimations of the effect of inequality on inflation perceptions in EU-15 countries from 1990
to 2008. The dependent variable is the inflation perception index (varying between a minimum
of -58.4 and a maximum of 77.7 in the sample). Inequality is measured by a Gini index varying
between 21.6 and 36.9. Per capita social expenditure in logs varies between 7.6 and 9.7. Controls
are actual inflation, unemployment rate, real GDP growth, actual household savings and country
and year fixed effects. The excluded instrument for inequality is social expenditure.
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APPENDIX
A Multiply Imputed Data Estimations
The SWIID data on inequality is unique in providing information on inequality in different
countries, calculated upon a uniform set of assumptions and definitions on harmonized micro-
data. The data construction is subject to a trade-off between comparability across countries
and coverage of country/years cells, resolved through a multiple-imputation procedure (Solt,
2009). Such procedure introduces some noise in the inequality data, but one of the advantages
of the SWIID dataset is that the researcher can appreciate the extent of such noise through the
availability of 100 different imputed time series for inequality in each country. As a consequence,
we can perform our analysis on SWIID data using two different approaches. The uncertainty
introduced by multiple imputation can be resolved by simply averaging the 100 inequality se-
ries available for each country, as done in the tables above. Alternatively, we also estimated all
models using Rubin (1987)’s approach, i.e. by estimating one separate model on each of the
100 inequality series, through multiple Monte Carlo simulations, and then pooling our set of
100 estimates by averaging the outcomes.18 Our findings are strongly consistent under the two
approaches, and we do not find any appreciable difference in our estimates. If anything, the
estimates obtained though Monte Carlo simulations tend to deliver larger point estimates and
t-statistics. The F-statistics of weak instruments tend instead to be slightly smaller, but well
above the threshold of 10 indicated by Staiger and Stock (1997) as the criterion for testing for
instrument weakness when the parameters are just identified.19
B Additional Tables
18See also King et al. (2001).
19Results are not reported but are available upon request.
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Table A.1: Consumers Preferences on Being Rich, Have
Money and Expensive Things
(1)
Imp. Expensive
Things
Difficult on Income
2nd decile 0.002
(0.007)
3rd decile -0.007
(0.007)
4th decile -0.008
(0.008)
5th decile -0.016**
(0.008)
6th decile -0.011
(0.008)
7th decile 0.002
(0.008)
8th decile -0.000
(0.008)
9th decile 0.008
(0.008)
10th decile 0.077***
(0.009)
Observations 57,815
R-squared 0.077
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Data from the European Social Survey collected every two years from
2002 to 2012 for the 15 major European countries. The dependent
variable in columns (1) is a dummy variable equal to 1 if respondents
consider themselves very much like, like, or somewhat like a person for
whom it is “Important to be rich, have money and expensive things”
(0 if a little like, not like, or not like such person at all). The data on
income deciles are only collected for the years 2008, 2010 and 2012 for
all countries excluding Austria. All regressions include demographic
controls for age and gender, country dummies and year dummies.
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Table A.2: LIML 3SLS Estimates: Sensitivity to Euro Country Exclusion
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES BE DK DE IE EL ES FR IT
Inequality 2.134 1.540 2.324 1.921 2.104 2.126 2.243 2.353
(0.304) (0.316) (0.319) (0.391) (0.321) (0.345) (0.335) (0.333)
Actual Inflation 6.992 5.638 6.024 6.536 5.805 6.064 5.757 5.371
(1.040) (1.120) (1.150) (1.339) (1.104) (1.244) (1.167) (1.082)
Euro Introduction 42.782 46.292 44.247 46.167 44.422 44.831 44.215 45.938
(2.769) (3.046) (2.849) (2.636) (2.737) (2.811) (2.836) (2.788)
Observations 227 227 229 227 236 227 228 227
R-squared 0.751 0.680 0.712 0.703 0.680 0.681 0.681 0.680
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Macro Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
UB in Social Exp. YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
F Stat Weak Instr. 185.2 151 172.3 138.3 178.7 172.3 172.4 192.5
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
VARIABLES LU NL AT PT FI SE UK
Inequality 2.254 2.332 2.242 3.181 1.845 2.062 2.198
(0.341) (0.334) (0.334) (0.477) (0.346) (0.343) (0.366)
Actual Inflation 5.748 5.515 5.582 6.483 5.522 5.702 5.717
(1.112) (1.173) (1.111) (1.349) (1.042) (1.111) (1.185)
Euro Introduction 44.978 43.903 45.775 45.572 48.530 44.384 46.045
(2.908) (2.791) (2.890) (2.915) (2.664) (3.412) (3.471)
Observations 239 227 232 227 232 232 227
R-squared 0.685 0.712 0.689 0.672 0.716 0.650 0.696
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Macro Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
UB in Social Exp. YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
F Stat Weak Instr. 259.6 171 176.7 74.83 178.8 177.3 177.8
Robust standard errors in parentheses
3SLS estimations of the effect of inequality on inflation perceptions in EU-15 countries from 1990 to 2008.
The dependent variable is the inflation perception index (varying between a minimum of -58.4 and a max-
imum of 77.7 in the sample). Inequality is measured by a Gini index varying between 21.6 and 36.9. Per
capita social expenditure in logs varies between 7.6 and 9.7. Controls are actual inflation, unemployment
rate, real GDP growth, and year fixed effects. The excluded instrument for inequality is social expenditure.
The excluded instrument for social expenditure is a dummy for the signature of the Maastricht Treaty in
1992. Each equation is estimated dropping one country (indicated by column) from the sample.
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